Get it? There is no money!
On or about July 21, 2011 Defendant was served notice of a claim on an executory arrangement, purporting to reference a contract in default. While custom would see this cause of action as a dispute over property rights, as in a debtor-creditor contract, it is the law of the trust which defines these relationships as mutually beneficial and pertaining not to property, but the unalienable right of the defendant to privately extinguish obligations through a trusted financial intermediary that is, or ought to be, statutorily required to fully disclose the nature and character of its fiduciary duty.
The right to the use of the real estate was successfully transferred with an executory arrangement between Plaintiff as Vendor and John Wade Moore as Vendee. That PURCHASE AND SALE agreement was facilitated by professionals. That special relationship was defined by a transfer of “money” for land, that flowed in one direction, with a concurrent transfer of land for money, flowing in the other direction. Those reciprocal transfers of res and benefit, comprising two trusts with responsibilities and values moving in opposite directions was duly executed in private.
The Plaintiff claims a right to specific performance on a default, but the Plaintiff comes with unclean hands. Having avoided all attempts at equitable discovery as to the nature and character of the res and benefits (rights and duties) flowing in opposite directions, the Plaintiff fails to prove there is a contract. The contract requires a meeting of the minds or simply put: assent. If it involves real estate, then the statute of frauds requires the contract to be in writing. The contract would require the signatures of the parties and consideration.
In Florida, a promissory note is a negotiable instrument. A promissory note is clearly a negotiable instrument within the definition of section § 673.1041 (1) FS and either the ORIGINAL must be produced, or in the event of a lost note, the document must be re-established under section § 673.3091 (2) FS. In this case, the Plaintiff clearly FAILED to attempt to move Court to re-establish the necessary PROMISSORY NOTE under § 673.3091 (2) FS or any other Florida statute upon filing and initiating frivolous complaint.
The reasoning seems to be that, as a negotiable instrument, only the original can have a monetary value. In the Bank Officers Handbook of Commercial Banking Law Within the United States; 6th edition; by Milton R. Schroeder; 1982 version; §19.02 NATURE OF BANK ACCOUNTS
(c) Special Deposits. Special deposits may take a number of forms. Sometimes they are a means of holding funds in litigation, trust funds, and cash securities of various types, such as deposits to show good faith in the case of contracts and the like. Attorneys maintain such accounts to hold funds of clients for whom they are fiduciaries. Special deposits are created by special contract between the bank and the depositor. In most instances of special deposits for the benefit of a third person, the bank becomes a trustee of the deposit for the benefit of the named person. Special deposits are often payable upon demand, sometimes upon terms, and occasionally they bear small amounts of interest. In many instances, such accounts are evidenced by certificates of deposit.
(d) Certificates of Deposit. Certificates of deposit (CDs) are instruments issued by the bank specifying that a certain sum of money has been deposited. These certificates may be either negotiable or nonnegotiable. When nonnegotiable, the bank simply contracts to return the amount to the depositor plus any contracted-for interest. If the certificate is negotiable, the bank agrees to pay the depositor or any person whom the depositor shall order, or the bearer of the certificate. When the CD is a negotiable CD, the debt of the bank is to the legal holder of the certificate and not to the original depositor.
So, here we have the Plaintiff bringing evidence of a transfer of value from the Defendant with a copy of a promissory note as a negotiable instrument, but no evidence of a reciprocal transfer of value from the Plaintiff, with active avoidance of Defendant's equitable requests for discovery.
As equity regards as done what ought to be done, in the private relationship between the first possessor of valuable trust property and Plaintiff, the financial intermediary's fiduciary duty is to convert the trust property for the purpose of extinguishing an obligation through conversion of the instrument, which is within the Plaintiff-trustee's proprietary (as in a monopoly) ability and area of expertise.
In this open executory arrangement the grantor is first possessor of an instrument whose value, once converted, is to be held by the trustee for the benefit of the party chosen by the grantor. This is where there is either an accident, a mistake or a FRAUD. The purpose of that instrument was to extinguish John Wade Moore’s/Vendee's obligation to the Plaintiff/Vendor in the first executory arrangement. The instrument must have been converted into a negotiable instrument in order for that obligation to have been satisfied. Those titles were merged and the twin trusts were extinguished.
No detriment to the Plaintiff is proven in the cause of action, so there is no charge upon which relief can be granted. The cause fails to show the connection between the Plaintiff and Defendant with an accurate and complete accounting of the movement of title and is especially deficient in showing the source of the value in this arrangement, which is ancillary to the transaction for use and enjoyment to the abode. Failure to prove that Plaintiff provided consideration undermines the actionable requirement of a detriment.
The Defendant deposits with the Plaintiff as financial intermediary and orders the payment of the converted value to be delivered to the Seller/Vendor, as per the arrangement. Trusted fiduciary completes that and implies that this aspect of the transfer was a loan, without showing any evidence of value coming from anywhere but the converted trust res, which was created by the Defendant for conversion and delivery to the Vendor. There was no loan. There is no proven detriment to the Plaintiff upon which relief may be granted.
There is a lack of disclosure. There may be collusion and FRAUD. Defendant repeatedly expressed the intention to cancel the arrangement due to lack of disclosure that these instruments were to be converted into unregistered securities and sold without written permission, without consent, without consideration which may be illegal pursuant to The Securities Act of 1933 and/or a FRAUD under The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970.
Defendant/Grantor previously and herein orders Plaintiff-trustee to return the original issue trust property. As financial intermediary Plaintiff must be constrained from using trust property or curtailing Defendant's right to the use and enjoyment of special deposit, trust property. As the natural beneficiary, Defendant claims the superior, substantive right and demands the return of all the trust property or its equivalent value. Plaintiff, or court appointed Master must provide a final accounting, which is the equitable right of the beneficiary. Promptly return all deposits made into the account, regardless of how they were misconstrued, accounted for or posted. Return all associated costs, charges and fees imposed ab initio.
Without consideration from the Plaintiff there is no contract to establish. A trust does not require consideration. No party to a trust needs to know that a trust is being formed. The exclusive jurisdiction of trust is in equity. Equity acts in personam and not in rem. Only the Defendant has first-hand knowledge of the intent of the grantor. There is no other party present before the court.
The court cannot allow the trust to fail for lack of a trustee. Defendant instructs the court to construct/establish the trust, appoint a trustee, ledger the accounts, quiet the titles and dismiss the case with all rights, titles and interest to the trust property being returned to the Defendant as beneficiary. Furthermore;
The case is under appeal. (See exhibit III: a copy of Appellant’s NOTICE of APPEAL.) Also attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit IV are duly filed public NOTICES reflecting the true nature of the Grantor’s intent, nomenclature changes, and the transfer of trust res.
 see Fl statute 90.953, which in pertinent part states: 90.953 Admissibility of duplicates.—A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original, unless: (1) The document or writing is a negotiable instrument as defined in s. 673.1041, a security as defined in s. 678.1021, or any other writing that evidences a right to the payment of money, is not itself a security agreement or lease, and is of a type that is transferred by delivery in the ordinary course of business with any necessary endorsement or assignment. (2) A genuine question is raised about the authenticity of the original or any other document or writing. (3) It is unfair, under the circumstance, to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original. History.—s. 1, ch. 76-237; s. 1, ch. 77-77; s. 22, ch. 78-361; s. 1, ch. 78-379; s. 57, ch. 92-82; s. 29, ch. 99-2.
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 The prohibition on the payment of interest on demand accounts in the Federal Reserve Act, 12 USC § 371 (1982), was crucial to the Federal Reserve Board's actions in limiting the participation of its member banks in establishing a secondary market for certificates of deposits or other negotiable time deposits issued by the bank. The Board concluded that a member bank could facilitate the sale of its negotiable time deposits by arranging to find a purchaser for a time deposit that a customer was trying to sell; that is, in doing this, the member bank would not be violating the principle that a penalty should be imposed for payment of a time deposit prior to maturity. However, the Board said that a member bank's purchase of a negotiable time deposit that it had issued should be viewed as an early redemption of the time deposit. Thus, here the member bank would be violating the rule that requires charging a penalty for early redemption of the time deposit. The Board indicated that a member bank could enter into an arrangement with an unaffiliated third party in which the third party agreed to purchase time deposits held by the bank's customers, but the Board believed thaI a reciprocal arrangement of this kind between member banks violated the rule. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Member Bank Participation in the Secondary Market for its Own Time Deposits, (1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) f 99,272 (Aug. 27, 1982).